SUBSTITUTE, VICTOR, LIBERATOR: THE POSSIBILITIES OF A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL ACCOUNT OF ATONEMENT FOR FEMINIST THEOLOGY - PART II
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Substitutionary Atonement’s Possibilities for Feminist Theology
Feminist theologian Arnfríður Guðmundsdóttir notes of arguments like those we’ve surveyed above, “What has frequently been lacking in this criticism is to make a clear distinction between use and abuse of theological arguments, between theology being abused or essentially abusive. This is particularly true of theological discourse about the cross.” (21) My two central complaints with the above criticisms of substitutionary atonement are that: 1) they are largely based on both a flawed understanding and interpretation of the doctrine of penal substitution (and substitution more broadly) as it has been historically understood by its key formulators and as it is developed from Scripture, and 2) that substitutionary theologies of atonement, rather than being anti-feminist or pro-abuse, offer possibilities for feminist theology which atonement accounts that attempt to leave substitution out cannot. However, neither should either penal or substitutionary atonement be held as the only atonement doctrine. I will argue here that instead, a multi-dimensional atonement model, which includes substitutionary atonement, provides a firmer and more fruitful grounding for feminist theology.
To my first point: the charge that the abuse of the Son by the Father condones abuse of women, children, and the vulnerable via surrogacy falls short when both Trinitarian theology and historic atonement theology are rightly understood and applied. The persons of the Trinity cannot be divided in such a way that the Father is said to abuse the Son – this is a version of tritheism, positing the triune persons as three separate Gods, rather than the one triune God of the historic Christian creeds. Augustine famously utilized the maxim opera trinitatis ad extra indivisa sunt to declare that the external works of the three persons of the one God are indivisible. (22) That is, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are at work together in Christ’s incarnation, crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension – in a word, in the entirety of humanity’s salvation (however, as with the Father in creation and the Son in redemption, certain persons of the Trinity may be more evident at times, though they are still working inseparably). To separate the divine persons in such a way that the Father is abusing the Son (with or without the Son’s consent) is to project a lack of harmony into the united work of the one Triune God. Furthermore, both Anselm and Calvin (whom Brock and Parker reference when taking issue with the atonement doctrines of satisfaction and substitution) (23) emphasize that the Son voluntarily, in perfect accord with the Father, chose to die. (24)
Moreover, in the classic doctrine of substitutionary atonement, the Son’s role is one which only he can and did fulfill as God in the flesh, the God-Man. This is one of the crucial points of Anselm’s work Cur Deus Homo (Why the God-Man?): it was only Christ, fully divine and fully human, who could provide the satisfaction due God for mankind’s failure to act justly, as God had made them to do, and thus reconcile God and people. (25) Calvin similarly posits that only Christ could act as Mediator, providing salvation and reconciling humanity to God. (26) Both Anselm and Calvin, then, eschewed the notion that any other human being could reprise Christ’s willing and salvific death in the crucifixion. The idea that Christ’s death should be held up as a blueprint for abuse does not square with this focus on Christ alone as the one achieving redemption once and for all. Though Jesus did tell his followers that they too would suffer (Matt. 10:17, Luke 21:12), and Paul taught that Christians would both suffer and be glorified with Christ (Rom. 8:17), the context of these statements was the persecution which Christians endured from the state or from others for their witness of Christ and the tribulation which is part of life, not a sanctioned abuse of others; both Christ and Paul taught that Christians were to love one another compassionately and gently as a sign of their faith (John 13:35, Col. 3:14). Therefore, those who attempt to justify abuse based on substitutionary atonement are not doing so in a way that accords with Scripture or with historical, robustly-trinitarian atonement theology.
Secondly, I argue that, so far from promoting abuse, substitutionary atonement in fact offers possibilities for feminist theology which atonement accounts that leave it out cannot: such views do not have the means to achieve justice for those who are abused or oppressed. Theologians who attempt to do away with substitutionary atonement (such as Williams, Brock, and Parker) yet call attention to pressing injustices (sins, in fact) that have been committed against women ironically undercut their own efforts, since removing substitutionary atonement makes it impossible for these wrongs to be redressed truly and lastingly. The most that these theologians can offer to those who suffer and are abused is a suggestion that they resist such abuse, knowing that God does not condone it. Though it is true that God does not condone it, this still fails to meaningfully deal with evil; for this to occur, there must be justice.
We seem to recognize this readily enough in the public sector and in the life of the church – calls for reparations to indigenous people and to other people of color, and for justice for victims, acknowledge the reality that evil cannot simply be resisted but must be vindicated for true justice to occur. Fleming Rutledge, a noted Episcopalian preacher and writer on the atonement, argues, “Compassion alone [without satisfaction for sin] will not make right what is wrong. It will not rectify […] the horrors perpetrated over the ages.” (27) This is why the concept of payment for sin via substitution is essential. We have all committed injustices against one another; none of us are innocent. And our crimes must be redressed. Thus, in the doctrine of substitution – as Karl Barth puts it – the Judge is judged in our place. (28) Sin and evil are and will be judged in and by the person of Christ, who bore the judgement due humanity to obtain forgiveness and reconciliation for the repentant. In this schema, the atonement is an integral part of redemptive history and fits into the arc of divine justice. Either the effects of the atonement are applied to the repentant, in which case, ideally divine justice is then reflected in earthly repentance and restitution, or final, eschatological justice is meted out to unrepentant oppressors. Regardless of whether justice is actualized via physical reparations to survivors and legal punishment of oppressors, satisfaction for sins and justice are meted out through the cross and beyond it. Of course, this is emphatically not to say that such forms of legal and material justice should not be pursued by Christians – they should! – but rather to offer hope even to those who do not see such justice in this life.
However, as I have suggested, neither penal substitution nor non-penal substitutionary atonement should stand alone as an atonement theory. Rather, to truly offer hope for women and other marginalized people, substitutionary atonement must be included as part of a multi-faceted approach to the atonement that includes, among other things, the focus on the cross as a site of victory characteristic of Christus Victor accounts. In the Christus victor motif, Christ is understood as defeating the powers of sin, death, and evil on the cross. His victory is then made his people’s; both the New Testament and historical atonement theology emphasize that the people of God are victorious over “every kind of harmful thing” because of Christ’s victory on their behalf. (29) Those who suffer are given hope that Christ has conquered, and that sin and death do not have the final word. This is why a multi-faceted atonement doctrine that also incorporates other atonement accounts, such as that of Christus victor, is essential. Such an approach can mete out justice and show that evil and sin have been and will be defeated and destroyed. It should can also empower those who are oppressed by demonstrating a means of victory and liberation through the cross. Other atonement motifs, such as ransom, satisfaction, moral exemplar, etc., are also useful and necessary, but I highlight Christus victor here as it more directly addresses the issues of justice at hand.)
What ultimately frees and gives hope to women who have suffered at the hands of others? Is it the knowledge that they can defeat their oppressors by their own resistance? While such resistance is valuable, what of women who never achieve victory by these means – how is justice to be theirs? As I have argued above, atonement theology which abandons substitutionary atonement cannot provide meaningful justice. It is only, I believe, through a multi-dimensional account of atonement in which we view Christ both as substitute both for our sins and those of others (as well as Liberator, Victor, etc.) that women’s suffering can truly be seen as redressed via atonement and justice meted out via the Judge who is Judged in our place.
21. Guðmundsdóttir in Johnson, T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, 345–46. Emphasis original.
22. Augustine of Hippo, On the Trinity, 1.7.
23. Brock and Parker, Proverbs of Ashes, 29–30.
24. “Why God Became Man” in Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works, ed. Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 2.17, pp. 346–47. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, vol. 1 (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1960), II.xvi.12, p. 518.
25. Anselm, Anselm of Canterbury, 2.6-7, pp. 319–21.
26. Calvin, Institutes, 1: II.xii.1-3, pp. 464–67.
27. Fleming Rutledge, The Crucifixion: Understanding the Death of Jesus Christ, 1st edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2017), 153. Emphasis original.
28. Barth, Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of Reconciliation, Volume 4, Part 1, 211–83.
29. Calvin, 1: II.xv.4, p. 499.
